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Abstract
Catalan Carlism was one of the most prominent versions of European anti-liberalism and counter-revolution. This article delves into 
a debate on the traditional and/or modern nature of the social movements; the relationship between religion, politics and identity; the 
impact of the civil wars on the construction of nation-states; and the exercise of power and violence. In a context of factories and 
workers, Carlism built the longest insurrectional guerrilla culture in all of Europe and became the theatre of operations of the “inter-
national white”.
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A long civil war. Carlism and counter-
revolution in Catalonia, 19th and 20th 
centuries
The counter-revolution in Spain is generically called Car-
lism from the Christian names (Carles/Carlos/Charles in 
Catalan/Spanish/English) of the pretenders to the Crown. 
A study of the nature and evolution of Carlism could shed 
light on the traditional and/or modern nature of the so-
cial movements; the relationship between politics, reli-
gion and identity; the impact of civil wars in constructing 
nation-states; and the exercise of power and violence. 
More than an exhaustive historical survey, we are inter-
ested in the response to these challenges. Rethinking the 
Catalan version of counter-revolution is a good chance to 
cast doubt on unilinear political pathways.
Carlism represented the space of the traditionalist 
Catholic and antiliberal right, a European movement 
comparable to Portuguese Miguelism and the Italian an-
ti-unitarian resistances.1 No other movement was capable 
of being an armed alternative for such a long period of 
time and of receiving such major social support. At the 
time of the Piedmontese army’s entrance into Rome, the 
Paris Commune and the First Spanish Republic, Carlism 
was the spearhead of the international white. The Carlist 
candidate for the Spanish throne was the hope of the ex-
iled courts around Europe.
We shall evaluate five major strands in this text: first, 
the political trauma experienced by the sectors who chose 
anti-liberalism with the advent of the liberal revolution; 
secondly, the Carlist insurrectionist culture in the series 
of civil wars; third, Carlism’s relationship with the 
Church, the role of political Catholicism and the portray-
al of the wars as crusades; fourth, the nature of Carlist 
foralism; and fifth, the capacity to construct a rich politi-
cal culture and appear as a lifeline in a turbulent mass so-
ciety.
The origins of early Carlism and the 
political trauma of the revolution
The hegemonic discourse in Catalan historiography on 
Catalonia’s supposedly cutting-edge position compared 
to Spain has hampered a proper understanding of early 
Carlism. According to this discourse, Catalonia was the 
“factory of Spain”, but the bourgeoisie was frustrated at 
not having sufficient tools of social control and industrial 
promotion in an agrarian, militaristic state. In this model, 
Catalonia was obsessed with Spain’s modernisation, con-
founding the interests of the ruling patriciate in the 18th 
century and the new bourgeoisie in power on the one 
hand with the plurality of existing interests on the other. 
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The history of Catalonia and Spain was neatly explained 
in terms of failures and weaknesses, as an expression of 
the industrialists’ and politicians’ angst over a supposed 
historical mission that had to be accomplished, as if Cata-
lonia were the Piedmont of Spain. The scholarly claims 
around Antoni de Capmany established a canon that 
marginalised the existence of a diverse range of formulas 
for handling the crisis. The Catalans were “the Dutch of 
Spain”, as the writer José Cadalso said in 1774. This por-
trait is similar to the ones proffered by travellers on the 
Grand Tour, who saw the Catalans as austere business-
people and religious fanatics. It was an apparent contra-
diction between tradition and modernity which subse-
quent historiography has been unable to translate into an 
understanding of what was actually afoot.
The success of business in the 18th century, within an 
estate-based society, was interpreted as a positive sign of 
modernisation. Some wealthy sectors believed that the 
exhaustion of the imperial system could be combined 
with solutions that would stave off the fears of revolution. 
The belief that the Constitution of Cadiz would result in 
an extension of rights and citizen participation led to the 
political disquiet of a set of reformist elites. Their behav-
iour can also be explained as a reaction to the silent anti-
feudal revolution of the lower classes via their failure to 
pay tithes and other allowances. These resistances 
emerged within a climate of broad social violence after 
the collapse of the state in 1808, which led to a debate on 
the legitimacy of plebian action against the pusillanimous 
authorities and landowners. We cannot situate the behav-
iours of these first reformist and later reactionary elites 
without grasping the depth of these fears.
One testimony of the diverse range of pathways to 
modernisation was Ramón Llàtzer de Dou (1742-1832). 
The teacher of early Carlist leaders and writers, such as 
Bartomeu Torrabadella and Vicenç Pou, he was a prestig-
ious jurist, the author of one of the most important books 
on public law and the rector of the university in Cervera, a 
school that played a prime role in training the elites and 
defending private law, which was also associated with 
property transmission. In Cádiz, Dou was the first presi-
dent of the constituent courts and one of the mouthpieces 
of the interests of the patriciate, comprised of the petty 
nobility; merchants of agrarian goods and products man-
ufactured for the northern European, American and pen-
insular markets; and the Church sector, which was in-
volved in family economies. The success of Catalonia’s 
agrarian economy led to the spread of the institution of 
the hereu and the emphyteutic tax, and this is why Dou 
suggested that it be extended to all of peninsular Spain as 
a solution to the structural crisis.2
Dou belonged to a patriciate which navigated between 
the estate-based order and the view of wealth as a catego-
ry of distinction. He was in favour of the English political 
and economic model based on landowners’ influence in 
Parliament and the enactment of new political economy 
laws. He also leaned toward the Dutch model, which criti-
cised excessive spending, luxury and unbridled leisure, 
vices which would have negative effects by corrupting po-
litical forms. In a word, it was a route to capitalism with-
out the fears of the American or French Revolutions. It 
was a capitalistic Catholic ethics geared at maximum con-
trol of political change by bringing the Church into the 
new framework of economic reforms. What liberalism 
viewed as the remnants of feudalism the traditionalists 
saw as institutions that assured a peaceful shift.
Despite this, badgered by the internal conflicts at the 
university and the radicalisation of political liberalism in 
Barcelona, Dou ultimately aligned with openly reaction-
ary positions. He and others like him represented an early 
strategy of moderation and political accommodation. 
Something similar happened with the influential religious 
writer Jaume Balmes in the 1840s, when he spotted the 
class conflict in industrialisation before Juan Donoso 
Cortés did, alarmed by the social content of the revolu-
tions of 1848. The Catalan historical dynamic led it to lag 
somewhat behind the Spanish dynamic. Without this, it is 
difficult to understand how Catalan Carlism followed a 
different timeframe than its counterparts in the Basque 
Country and Madrid. In 1846, 1860, 1869 and 1872, Cata-
lan Carlism was at the vanguard of armed Carlism all over 
Spain, while in 1840 and 1875 the war exhausted itself in 
the Catalan Principality following rhythms similar to 
those experienced in the Maestrat and in the north in the 
Basque Country/Navarra. 
Neatly delineating economic and political liberalism is 
never easy, although the Carlists were the perennial ene-
mies of liberal parliamentarism. In contrast, in terms of 
economic liberalism, they were against the first wave of 
disentailments and the troubles caused by the abolition of 
the seigneurial regime. Several years later, the key factor 
was the defence of the bourgeoisie itself. The tacit accept-
ance of the 1851 Concordat, which sanctioned the peace 
between the Church and the liberal state, led to this new 
shift. Late in the 19th century, the federal republican poli-
tician Valentí Almirall metaphorically described the so-
cial leadership of Carlism as “espadrille aristocrats”.3
The earliest armed antiliberal expressions, such as the 
royalist uprising of 1822-1823, the Revolt of the Malcon-
tents in 1827 and the First Carlist War between 1833 and 
1840, have been viewed as an expression more of eco-
nomic malaise and coercion than the main actors’ politi-
cal and ideological worldview. Our scholarly shortcom-
ings in political and cultural history have rendered us 
unable to pinpoint the ideological motivations, religiosi-
ty, political identity, monarchism and worldview that the 
Carlist base and leaders may or may not have shared. Was 
economic survival sufficient reason to explain repeated 
affiliation with the cause? How was it possible that Cata-
lonia, a paradigm of modernity, would simultaneously 
show such social support for absolutism so early on?
In the 1970s, the historians Josep Fontana and Jaume 
Torras situated the behaviour of the wealthy classes with-
in the logic of capitalist transformations. Understanding 
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royalism and Carlism depended on an interpretative 
model of the liberal revolution which posited the lower-
class peasants and artisans as the victims, and which 
avoided the old liberal discourses about a pre-political, 
fanatical world manipulated by the Church. Those histo-
rians were influenced by Eric J. Hobsbwam’s Primitive 
Rebels, and the study of the royalist movements took a no-
ticeable turn partly for this reason.
The data that Josep Fontana found when studying the 
Treasury during the crisis of the Old Regime led him to 
consider the negative impact that the liberal tax policy 
had on specialised, market-orientated farm regions. 
Jaume Torras’ research on the Malcontents and the royal-
ist uprising in 1822 and 1923 found that the conduct of 
the lower classes could be explained not as supporting the 
old feudal order but as channelling of their frustration 
against the specific kind of change underway. This experi-
ence accentuated the deterioration in their living condi-
tions due to the aggressive tax policy, low agrarian prices 
and the crisis in domestic industry. This downturn made 
the social perception of the antagonisms understandable 
beyond the absolutism versus liberalism dichotomy and 
enabled him to posit the hypothesis, unexplained still to-
day, that the aspiration to establish a paternal monarchy 
could attract different bases of support.
In turn, Josep Fontana posited two important hypoth-
eses. The first was based on the distinction between the 
leaders and the peasant bases, who were arrayed against a 
common enemy. The second viewed the Carlist territory 
as a failed, impoverished country compared to the overall 
prosperity of the 18th century. This thesis was picked up 
by Ramón Arbanat in a study on the royalist movement 
during the Liberal Triennium (1820-1823), while Pere 
Anguera finds the grassroots support of early Carlism to 
be caused by the social erosion of the peasants and arti-
sans. The people were hungry, and becoming a guerrilla 
was a way of earning a living in a context where dismay 
with the clergy had become quite widespread.4
The latter two have defined more interpretative lines. 
Manuel Santirso’s defence has stressed the political di-
mension and economic interests of absolutism, without 
losing sight of the close connection between war and rev-
olution. The violent, vertical coalescence into factions 
and battalions allows him to question the sincere support 
of Carlism. The historian Núria Sauch has developed an-
other line of inquiry on southern Catalan Carlism. This 
author focused on a particular theatre of operations, 
namely the lands of the Ebro River and the Maestrat re-
gion, in a study that spanned 40 years which reframed the 
logic of the seigneurial conflicts and the impact of institu-
tional changes in local power. Her study was inspired by 
the approaches of her teacher, the historian Jesús Millán. 
They posit that the success of the Carlist wars could not 
be sustained without the clientele’s support of the local 
elites’ initiatives.5
The most prolific Carlist writer who published the 
most successful book on early Carlist traditionalism in 
1843, Las leyes fundamentales de la monarquía española, 
was the Mercedarian clergyman Magí Ferrer (1792-1853). 
He upheld an estate-based political architecture which 
carved a niche for privileged landowners who were not 
noblemen. The goal was to give property owners political 
respectability and representation in the future Courts, to 
conserve the lead in local power and to allay the negative 
effects of political upheaval to the extent possible.6 This 
position was not very distant from the Catalan responses 
to the Consultation of the Country in 1809, nor from the 
ideas of the leading Carlist theoretician in the second half 
of the 19th century, the Valencian Antoni Aparisi i Gui-
jarro. This class would soon be defined in economic terms 
as landowners – either longstanding nobility who had 
seen better days or the “espadrille aristocracy” – without 
falling into the dangers of national sovereignty or popular 
participation.
We are unaware of the ideological features of the Cata-
lan counterrevolution beyond the classic support of the 
Throne and the Altar. Historiography has erroneously 
thought that the ambiguity of Carlist ideas was deliber-
ately not explicit. The problem has always been ascertain-
ing what lies behind the trilogy “God, Fatherland and 
King”, with the furs (charters) tagged on. No systematic 
analysis has been conducted of either the texts or their au-
thors, or of the agitators or propagandists. Even though 
many of them were indebted to the schemes developed in 
France and Italy, the logic of counterrevolutionary na-
tional cultures should be explored, including the culture 
in Catalonia.
The longest civil war in Europe and the 
Catalan Carlist insurrectionist culture
The Carlist narrative encompasses a long succession of 
episodes which include the Peninsular War (1808-1814), 
the royalist uprising of 1822-1823, the Revolt of the Mal-
contents in 1827 and the First Carlist War (1833-1840), 
the Second Carlist War between 1846 and 1849, the at-
tempted uprising of the factions in 1855, the frustrated 
coup d’état in Sant Carles de la Ràpita in 1860, alongside 
another more spirited uprising in the summer of 1869 
and the Third Carlist War between 1872 and 1875. This 
partisan culture of violence was supposed to enlist the ex-
iled leaders’ support for Francis II of the Two Sicilies in 
1861 and the intervention as Zouaves in the defence of 
Rome in 1870. It was one of the longest cycles of war in 
Europe, comparable to the one in Colombia and the Rio 
de la Plata, and all of this transpired in a climate of politi-
cal exceptionalism, a rejection of authority and uprisings 
against the fifths and compulsory recruitment with the 
possibility of exemption by payment.7
One testimony of the tensions between the military au-
thorities and the people comes from the liberal General 
Antonio Seoane. The interim Captain General of Catalo-
nia between 1841 and 1842 and a senator for Murcia in 
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1843, he launched a violent discourse against the uprising 
in Barcelona in November 1842. In his speech as a sena-
tor, he associated the Catalans’ rebelliousness with the ex-
istence of manufacturing hubs where radical ideas could 
take root. He claimed that Barcelona needed to be “bled”, 
as if it were an ill person, its industry transferred outside 
the city and customs established at the Ebro River. In his 
opinion, hearing talk about independence was much 
worse than if Charles had proclaimed absolutism. He was 
a prominent member of the progressive party who antici-
pated that other phrase uttered by the right-wing politi-
cian José Calvo Sotelo in 1935 by almost a century, in 
which he said he would rather a “roja que rota” [Red than 
a broken] Spain.8
The liberal army was the mouthpiece of the state at a 
time of institutional collapse and a crisis of legitimacy. 
The civil wars only fuelled the mistrust between the regu-
lar troops and the liberal local militias. In a context with 
no freedom of press, the suspension of constitutional 
guarantees and the failure of the Treasury, the army ap-
peared as the ugliest side of the nation, the administra-
tion’s last bulwark to charge taxes or force military recruit-
ment. With a true lack of division of powers and a state 
and an administration on the defensive, what was the im-
pact of the civil wars in terms of political nationalisation?
In Catalonia and the Region of Valencia, the cabdil-
latge leadership was part of a rich culture of insurrection. 
Just as in Latin America,9 the figure of the cabdill (or cau-
dillo, local leader) forged in the war against Napoleon 
survived as part of the myth of the people rising up in 
arms which reinforced the discourse of unanimity. In 
contrast, the cabdills were later the target of respectable 
criticism which blamed them for the delay in modernisa-
tion and the lack of institutional stability, if not actually 
fostering grassroots anarchy and tyranny. In Catalonia, 
the idealisation did not last too long, especially when the 
liberal press stigmatised the excesses of the cabdillatge 
during the Second Carlist War. 
The episode involving the skull of Charles d’Espagnac, 
known as the Count of Spain, is indicative of the stereo-
types of the cabdills. He was not a grassroots leader but 
the top Carlist military authority who ended up being as-
sassinated by his companions in 1839 with the excuse of 
his despotism. Liberal public opinion described him as a 
despot who shot prisoners and burned villages. Against 
this backdrop, his skull could be studied by phrenologists 
to define the Southern savage archetype. Once the skull 
was located by the physicians Josep Soler and Marià Cubí, 
it was associated with the Araucanians. The Catalan 
mountain blunderbuss was equated with the criminal 
Italian brigand and the savage American Indians, a social 
psychopathology of the reactionary who stood as the en-
emy of progress. These images were used later against 
Francesc Savalls, another Carlist cabdill nicknamed the 
“terror of the mountain”.10
In 1808, an insurrectional culture arose whose epicen-
tre was the guerrilla faction led by the cabdills. The leaders 
of the gangs were vehicles for politicisation and political 
modernisation and can in no way be considered an anom-
aly. The Carlist pretenders to the Spanish throne had to 
mobilise human resources against the liberal regime with 
a type of combatant who wielded power on behalf of the 
king in a decentralised network. Historians have not con-
ducted an in-depth analysis of the repercussions of this 
architecture of power and loyalties. The legitimist leaders 
conspired through military putsches, expecting the sup-
port of part of the military, while leaving the factions with 
the auxiliary mission of controlling the rural world. Their 
failure and its conversion into civil war has eclipsed their 
original purpose. Once the coffers were depleted, the scat-
tered rebellious factions began to coerce taxpayers, which 
led them to be questioned as the guarantors of order, 
which was ultimately crucial in gaining support.
A careful look at what happened in between 1846 and 
1875, the start and end of the Second and Third Carlist 
Wars, respectively, helps encapsulate the meaning of this 
insurrectional culture. The first surprising fact is that the 
Second Carlist War represents a hiatus in Carlist memo-
ry. Few authors spoke about it during the golden age of 
traditionalist publicity, not even in 1933, when the cen-
tennial was commemorated. What predominated was a 
liberal-leaning discourse that defined the matiners as a 
gang of blunderbusses. This war was unique in several 
ways. It garnered less support from the Church and the 
large landowners, perhaps because of the participation of 
artisans, textile workers and the petty peasant class who 
were affected by the economic crisis and the central gov-
ernment’s measures on conscription and taxes.11 During 
the last few months of the war, in January 1849, a mani-
festo signed by a group of peasants from La Garriga ap-
peared denouncing the debauchery of the parties, which 
fuelled the “communist” menace in the countryside. This 
was a false descriptor, but it did equate Carlism with po-
litical banditry.12
The violence committed during the Third Carlist War 
was condemned by liberal public opinion. Ridicule of the 
capellà trabucaire (blunderbuss clergyman), news on the 
destruction of railway and telegraph lines, the burning of 
civil registries and the felling of freedom trees served to 
stop the radicalisation of the First Republic from leading 
to a reaction among the conservative Catholic classes in 
the countryside. Given that the liberal side’s success in 
this war of images was complete, to what extent was the 
construction of the liberal state conditioned upon civil 
wars? The factions carved out experiments in sovereignty 
which would test the strength or weakness of the state in-
asmuch as sovereignty, or power, is not solely an attribute 
of the state but a quality that exists in an array of groups 
and entities within society. If we agree that the factions 
and cabdills supplanted political authority and hindered 
the goal of national unity by fragmenting power, their im-
pact on nationalisation processes is unquestionable.
Counter to an overly linear model of cabdills and their 
clientele who hindered the inevitable state centralisation, 
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civil wars were processes inherent to the construction of 
nation-states. The legitimate monopoly on strength and 
fiscal power was questioned everywhere. If we view fac-
tions as devices of power that can be used to guide, shape 
and control behaviours, the cabdills participated as na-
tionalising agents in multiple directions. Cabdills like 
Joan Castells, Benet Tristany, Ramón Cabrera and Franc-
esc Savalls represented a type of traditional charismatic 
authority that channelled the armed protest of the land-
owners and the grassroots Catholic social base. They rep-
resented a model of vertical social relations grafted onto 
the territory which complemented other forms of regular 
military organisation. The good gang leaders were part of 
a structure of exchanges. They provided quick social as-
cent because without compensation it was difficult to im-
pose deference and obedience to authority. They sought 
to vie with the liberal administration to exercise the mo-
nopoly on violence by kidnapping mayors and prominent 
taxpayers, blocking trade in villages and shooting adver-
sarial authorities, if needed. The factions also had a strong 
identity component because they followed one cabdill 
instead of another. In short, it was a type of culture that 
created a graveyard with the state which was negatively 
perceived not necessarily by Carlist swaths of the popula-
tion.13
The definitive crisis in this insurrectional culture came 
in 1875, in an exhausted, disillusioned country. Carlist 
monarchism ended up weakened by its pretender’s fall 
from grace, with his public and private image tarnished, 
just as had happened with Queen Isabella II. This bol-
stered the despotic image far from the intransigent 
Catholic sectors, which ultimately led to the 1888 Inte-
gralist schism.14 The Carlist king was incapable of han-
dling the exercise of power and the fragmentation of sov-
ereignty. 
The Carlist universe was made up of not only major 
theatres of operations, namely Catalonia, Valencia and 
the Basque Country-Navarra, and the subjective spaces 
of war that enabled the war experienced by each person 
to be recognised, but by two other spaces as well: the 
northern Catalan frontier and the Carlist court, either in 
exile or itinerant. This role would not have been possible 
without the support of the local legitimists, or without 
the farmers’ interest in having cheap labour, regardless 
of whether it was Carlists or young draft dodgers or army 
deserters. The protection of the valleys of Andorra played 
a prominent role in the first half of the 19th century, 
while in the third war they would remain a traditionalist 
symbol, a kind of unpolluted sanctuary under the sover-
eignty of the bishop of La Seu d’Urgell, Josep Caixal. The 
study of these spaces reveals that they played a more 
prominent role in the preparations for and course of the 
conflicts than in the subsequent experience of exile. The 
northern Catalan Carlists predominated in Salanca, 
Vallespir, the upper Cerdagne and along the Tec River. 
In contrast, the city of Perpignan was primarily republi-
can, even though it was the fulcrum of the main conspir-
acy. Near the frontier, factions were recruited, loans were 
Figure 1. Ramón Cabrera i Griñó (1806-1877), Catalan Carlist 
leader. Portrait of the National Library, Madrid, around 1845.
Figure 2. Francesc Savalls i Massot (1817-1886), leader of the Car-
list troops in Catalonia during the last Carlist war. He is wearing the 
typical red or white beret of the militants of this movement.
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negotiated, weapons and equipment were purchased, 
hospitals and printing presses were set up and Catalan 
colonies from the south were formed in Perpignan and 
Ceret.
Another problem came from Carlist emigrants and 
refugees all over France. The number of exiles was not 
directly related to the bulk of the contingents because 
the military circumstances, degree of violence and dis-
couragement led to the amnesty of thousands of men be-
fore they took refuge in the neighbouring country. Nor 
does the tally of combatants quantify all the personnel 
that passed through the factions and battalions. The 
number of refugees from the royalist revolt recorded by 
Ramon Arnabat was 2,200 men in 1823 from a force to-
talling 13,000; with the entry of Ramon Cabrera in July 
1840, the figure of 12,000 refugees is recorded out of a 
maximum force of 20,000; in 1849, after the Second Car-
list War was over, 2,500 accepted amnesty, a notable 
proportion in relation to the total of 8,000 troops; final-
ly, according to the figures for the last Carlist war that I 
have compiled, in 1876, 3,000 men out of a total of 
12,000 combatants, the maximum that could be sus-
tained by Carlist logistics, lived as refugees in France. 
Carlists lived permanently in double exile, regardless of 
whether they lived at home or suffered from deprivation 
abroad. Inasmuch as their vision of the world was fed by 
the eschatological struggle between good and evil, Carl-
ists were the victims of their own society’s degradation. 
Carlists suffered from the death of the Catholic nation 
like nobody else.15
The Carlist court occupied an estimable role in Carlist 
culture because it was able to share an emotional bond 
with the vicissitudes of the proscribed family. This type of 
journalistic information was fed by exiles’ and conspira-
tors’ visits to the core of the cause. The Carlist court was a 
travelling device of power made up of a small number of 
members compared to the reigning dynasties. It encom-
passed the royal family, the House and the Government, 
made up in turn of political and military secretaries and 
the field adjutant, and assisted at times by an extraordi-
nary advisor. The collective Carlist imagination through-
out the 19th and 20th centuries united the major Europe-
an capitals, the occasional residences in Paris and London 
and the palaces and castles of the legitimist families who 
practised a transnational monarchical solidarity. Carlist 
geography was scattered around Bourges, Viareggio, 
Gratz, Trieste and Frohsdorf, as well as the famous Palaz-
zo Loredan in Venice, where the banner salons and pri-
vate quarters were displayed in magnificent reports in the 
magazine El Estandarte Real between 1890 and 1891 and 
in the monographic album published by the “Fomento de 
la Prensa Tradicionalista” in 1907, both printed in Barce-
lona. Alongside them, the gilded London exile of the Car-
list general from Tortosa, Ramón Cabrera, captured pub-
lic attention for years as he became the prime symbol of 
grassroots Carlist faith, seldom subordinated to courtly 
twists and intrigues.
The war as crusade: The relationship 
between politics and religion in Carlism
Catalonia was a testing ground of the conflicts between 
the liberal project and the Church project, subjected to 
the liberal revolution, the papacy of Pius IX and the Cath-
olic reconquest process. It was a society fractured by so-
cial inequalities, although Catalonia would also become a 
“workshop of saints” and a denominational laboratory of 
the new Spanish Catholicism. Despite this, it would be 
wrong to apply a rigid model of social change which as-
sumed that the more modern and secular a society was, or 
the more rational, the lower the presence of the sacred 
was. Carlism did not suggest a return to the past but an 
appropriation of modernity. It was not so much a reac-
tion against modernity as a product of a modernity which 
felt alien. It was not so much a secularisation process as a 
weakening of the role of religion as a social glue.
In the late 18th century, unlike the Spanish discourse 
that strictly defended the Catholic monarchy, the leading 
Catalan groups sought to articulate the ideal of the com-
mercial empire with Catholic ideals. However, faced with 
the threats to the conservative order of families and prop-
erties, the Church’s response was extremely reactive. The 
Catalan hierarchy was more sensitive than the rest of the 
episcopacy to the surveillance of the tribunal of the Inqui-
sition as a tool of ideological control in the ruling dated 12 
December 1812. The Church emerged severely harmed by 
the government measures aimed at wiping out the chronic 
public debt and earning revenues to pay for the wars in the 
peninsular and overseas territories. It was affected not 
only in the jurisdictional realm but also socially and eco-
nomically. Between 1820 and 1840, the secular clergy was 
less absolutist than the regular clergy, the clergy in the cit-
ies less than those in the countryside, and the parish clergy 
less than the local clergy. The Catalan Church’s main affil-
iation was first royalist and then Carlist.16 In the second 
half of the century, most of the hierarchy remained at the 
ready, while the parish clergy sided with the Carlist bloc 
and became politicised in the ultramontane sense.
The Church was the institution that was damaged the 
most. It lost three-fourths of its income with the elimina-
tion of the tithes, first fruits, the laudemium and taxes. 
This was a total setback caused by the disentailments of 
religious assets and the elimination of monasteries and 
corporations, which spurred most Catalan bishops to re-
act. There was indeed a minority of ecclesiasts who were 
liberal, but at times of revolution the Catalan Church 
leaned towards the absolutist and Carlist side. During the 
royalist revolt in 1822, only the bishops of Barcelona and 
Girona were not absolutists, but by 1837, during the first 
war, the bishop of Barcelona was the only one who re-
mained faithful to the liberals. Even Pope Gregory XVI 
appointed Bartomeu Torrabadella to serve as deputy ap-
ostolic delegate in Catalonia; he had been a canon of Bar-
celona, chancellor of the university in Cervera and a disci-
ple of Ramón Llàtzer de Dou. He was an extremely 
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prominent leader and a link in the chain of weapons pur-
chases and war financing between the king of Sardinia, 
Charles Albert I, and Catalan Carlism.
With the consolidation of bourgeois society, the rela-
tionship between politics and religion coalesced. The ec-
clesiasts not only spent their efforts preventing the ad-
vance of liberal culture, but they also sought to rectify 
governance so that Catholic civil society would determine 
political and moral decisions. With this purpose in mind, 
one of the most renowned writers, Jaume Balmes, advo-
cated marriage between the Carlist pretender, the Count 
of Montemolín, and Queen Isabella II. The operation 
would marginalise the political game of the progressive 
wing of liberalism, leave behind the divisions of the civil 
war, acknowledge that it was impossible to restore the 
previous order and compromise with the spirit of the era. 
This roadmap was targeted not only at the modern Cata-
lan bourgeoisie but also at the rank-and-file Carlists.17
Jaume Balmes had a hand in the abdication of Carlos 
Maria Isidro, and he probably wrote the manifesto ad-
dressed to the Spaniards’ new pretender from Paris in May 
1845. Even though Balmes’ direct involvement in Carlism 
was brief, the traditionalists protested it. The type of pri-
orities held by the Catalan conservatives was also telling. 
Unlike their Spanish counterparts, who were capable of 
building bridges with the progressives, the Catalans cur-
tailed their constitutionalism and defended religious uni-
ty, which was what glued the Catalan right to the side of 
Carlism. While the bloc in power in Madrid included the 
two branches of liberalism, in Catalonia the aspiration 
was to unify the Catholic right because religion was be-
lieved to be the solution to meet the challenges of indus-
trial society. And for this very reason, it had to be trans-
formed into a modern, effective instrument.
The Catalan ecclesiasts who embraced the cause of 
Charles played a key role in building the propagandistic 
apparatus, promoting and leading a powerful pro-Vatican 
sector and updating the Catholics’ forms of mobilisation. 
The list of figures is quite lengthy. The most prominent 
names are Josep Caixal i Estradé, founder of the Llibreria 
Religiosa with Father Antoni Maria Claret, future bishop 
of La Seu d’Urgell and military vicar general of the Carlist 
armies throughout all of Spain; Francesc Palau i Quer, the 
former Carmelite founder of the Escola de la Virtut in 
1851 and the inspiration behind the Carlist eschatological 
climate; the young Fèlix Sardà i Salvany, founder of the 
Biblioteca Popular in 1870 and the Apostolat de la Premsa 
and the author of a subsequent bestseller, El liberalismo es 
pecado (1884); the priest Josep Escolà i Cugat, founder of 
the Acadèmia Mariana in Lleida in 1862; and prominent 
laymen like Ramón Vinader, Lluís Maria de Llauder and 
Josep Maria Carulla. Nor can we downplay the Carlist 
sympathies of Cardinal Isidre Gomà, one of the archpriests 
who lent the most wholehearted support to the coup d’état 
against the republican legal order in July 1936.18
This sector participated in the Catholic social recon-
quest in the 1860s, that is, in the first culture war against 
free thinking through the “good press”, Catholic acade-
mies and youth groups, gatherings, pilgrimages and pop-
ular theatre. Carlism grafted itself onto the ultramontane 
sector of the neo-Catholic followers of Juan Donoso Cor-
tés. Their success was so resounding that even though 
they were defeated in the Third Carlist War, the equation 
between traditionalism and defence of religion was con-
firmed in the Catalan bishops’ response to the apostolic 
nuncio’s survey in 1881. The good Catholic was a Carlist.
The defence of Pope Pius IX occupied the political 
agendas of European governments, while the faithful 
viewed it as a tragic crisis of civilisation. The Catholics’ 
veneration of the cause of Pius IX unleashed a cult of per-
sonality, a veritable “papolatry”, where the pontiff was 
held up as the modern-day continuation of the early 
Christian martyrs. The Catholics had fertile grounds for 
spreading the belief that the Carlist uprising in April 1872 
was the start of a crusade. The creation of a battalion of 
pontifical Zouaves in Catalan territory, an ultramontane 
militia fed by legitimists from all over Europe, material-
ised the existence of a Catholic-monarchical international 
white which viewed Charles VII of Bourbon as the Catho-
lic prince who would liberate Spain and Rome.19
Figure 3. Charles VII, pretender to the throne of Spain, in the last 
Carlist war (1872-1876). Representation taken from Antonio Pira-
la, Historia Contemporanea, Segunda Parte. Volume two, Madrid, 
1892.
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The prophetic, eschatological Carlist arguments make 
it possible to spotlight the kinds of solutions set forth to 
deal with the major cleavages that were splintering socie-
ty. To the antiliberals, the times were conditioned by 
Providence, which used traumatic events – revolutions – 
as a testing ground and a chance to expiate sins. Liberal-
ism was yet another link in the long chain of Mankind’s 
attacks against God. Catastrophe could only be avoided 
with a return to Catholic civilisation. The Carlist utopia 
was the first step in a providentialist restoration prior to 
the social reign of Christ. This was the position upheld by 
the most influential author in Catalan Carlism at the end 
of the century, Lluís Maria de Llauder, and it is related to 
the subsequent prophetic revival in the revolution of 
1868. The struggle between Good and Evil, us or them, 
everything or nothing, explains the high degree of vio-
lence in the lands where the fight with the federal republi-
cans was the fiercest. It should come as no surprise that an 
agent of the pretender advised him that “si se retarda el 
levantamiento perderemos muchos, que se pasan a la In-
ternacional” (“if you delay the uprising, we will lose many 
who will go over to the International”).20
Provincialism and codes of law.  
The fit between Catalonia and Spain
Grégoire Wyrouboff was a crystallographer born in Mos-
cow, a disciple of August Comte and a defender of posi-
tivism in France. He compiled his travel notes from a 
journey around northern Spain and the Ebro River in 
1874 in a brief work. He wanted to run Spain’s backward-
ness through the filter of his scientific mind. Neither the 
defence of religion nor the defence of the king were suf-
ficient motives to explain the survival of Carlism, and he 
pinpointed the problem as Vizcaya, Navarra and Catalo-
nia’s lack of harmony with the state. Political centralism 
had not triumphed under either the monarchy or the re-
public. In contrast, Spain was ripe for a federate regime 
because it was a plural country in terms of its languages, 
habits, traditions and geographic and industrial condi-
tions: “l’Espagne est une unité factice qui ne correspond à 
aucune réalité effective. De l’Andalousie à la Catalogne, 
de la Castille à la Biscaye, il y a au moins autant de diffé-
rence que de l’Italie à la France, de la Belgique à la Hol-
lande, de la Bohème à la Hongrie”. There was at least as 
much difference among the Spanish regions as there was 
among some European states. It would be difficult for 
any government, Wyrouboff observed, to sustain “sous la 
même loi”, societies with such opposing political tradi-
tions.21
We suggest three phases in the evolution of the politi-
cal identifications of Catalan Carlism: the one that sought 
a monarchy of provinces, the one that opposed the cen-
tralising efforts of the liberal state, and the one that would 
experience the hegemony of Catalanism in the early 20th 
century. In order to peer into the worldview of the early 
Carlists, we shall use the word “provincialism”, a term 
that defines the demands for attention to provincial inter-
ests – related to the Principality of Catalonia – aired by 
members of the Catalan ruling class in the transition from 
the 18th to the 19th centuries, taking the province as a 
subject of decision-making and political representation, 
with a conception of sovereignty and nation closer to the 
territorial distribution of power than the functional dis-
tribution of the state.
One of the first objectives of provincialism was to at-
tain representation and interlocution with the Crown. 
This demand appeared in the summons to the Courts in 
1760 and 1789, during the constituent process and appli-
cation of the Cadiz text, in the course of the Royal Statute 
and in the drafting of the 1837 constitution. In those ses-
sions, just as had happened with the deputies from the 
Americas between 1810 and 1813, it was common to have 
to apologise for bringing up provincial problems to avoid 
being labelled selfish for not focusing on the general 
problems of the nation. The word provincialist had pejo-
rative connotations.
Carlist political provincialism could harmonise with 
the historical will of the Catalan ruling class in order for 
Spain to become a Catholic, commercial monarchy com-
prised of provinces, more concerned with the recovery 
and preservation of the constitutions (furs) than with the 
constitutional revolution. The rules of obedience and def-
erence to the monarch made it unimaginable for this kind 
of request to be made on their own initiative outside the 
established channels other than in time of political excep-
tionalism, such as the one prompted by the power vacu-
um in the summer of 1808. Provincialism cut across ide-
ologies and was accepted by liberal sectors as well, as Jordi 
Roca has revealed, a liberalism like the moderate Barcelo-
na variety that was concerned with articulating the liberal 
Spanish nation through the Catalan constitutional cul-
ture of rights and freedoms, which the Diputació Provin-
cial de Catalunya legitimised in 1820.22 Throughout all 
those years, the range of proposals from provincialism 
included the opening of provincial Courts, the defence of 
the Catalan laws in force, the return of its own laws and 
constitutions and trade prohibitionism. The radical, 
democratic left shared elements of this culture in the un-
rest in the 1830s and 1840s and in the attempts to demol-
ish Barcelona’s Ciutadella.
Catalonia’s responses to the 1809 Consultation of the 
Country were part of this provincialist culture, as was the 
final report written by Antoni de Capmany, which de-
fended the modernity of the institutions that had been 
lost a century earlier. The same holds for the rulings of the 
Junta Superior de Catalunya written in 1810 by the jurist 
and later deputy Felip Aner d’Esteve, which asked for the 
furs and rights that the Catalans had had during the Hab-
sburgs’ reign to remain in place, a claim which the pro-
French deputy Josep Garriga had made shortly before in 
Bayonne. Years later, in 1836, the spokesman of the pro-
gressive group in the Courts, Domingo Maria Vila, pro-
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posed that the fueros of Basque and Navarra be extended 
to all of Spain.
In short, it is mistaken to assess Carlist foralism based 
on the silence of the first two Carlist pretenders to the 
crown or the negative judgement of it by Catalanist cul-
ture in the early 20th century. It was a kind of foralism 
concerned with preserving the existing furs, such as pri-
vate law, and with opposing the introduction of new taxa-
tion and conscription systems. And to do this, they had 
the legal arsenal of the former constitutions and customs 
at their disposal. When the historian Pere Anguera won-
dered whether there had been a Catalan Carlist proto-na-
tionalism, he responded negatively. And we think that he 
was right, but only in part of the problem. The proclama-
tion that Benet de Plandolit-Targarona signed in the East-
ern Pyrenees in October 1834 referred vaguely to the 
king’s promise to “guardar los antiguos privilegios de este 
Principado” (safeguard the old privileges of this Princi-
pality), but this meant preserving laws that were still in 
force, not those abolished in 1714. Despite the rumours 
or attempts to bring this reversal to fruition, the respons-
es from the Carlist leaders near the king were always neg-
ative: they were negative in 1836 when Carlos Cruz May-
or, the Minister of State, categorically refused to restore 
the furs, and in 1848 when Manuel Cubells, a close associ-
ate of the Count of Montemolín, opposed Tomàs Bertran 
i Soler’s plans for a provincial council.23
Until 1869, Carlism was reluctant to touch the political 
architecture that the Bourbons had imposed in the 18th 
century. The fact that there was a critical interpretation 
within Carlism of the centralisation process carried out 
by the dynasty is another matter entirely. Sectors in fa-
vour of reformist absolutism wanted to preserve the foral 
laws, which were running the danger of vanishing with 
the enlightened “national law” and the liberal codifica-
tion. In this climate, a French military officer remarked 
on the Revolt of the Malcontents in 1827: “il ne faut pas 
chercher la cause de cette guerre ailleurs que dans le car-
actère national des Catalans, qui tiens à leur législation” 
[there is no need to seek the cause of this war anywhere 
else than in the national character of the Catalans, who 
have their legislation].24 That is, the cause lay in their con-
stitutional culture.
Others went further, such as the Mercedarian priest 
Magí Ferrer in the aforementioned work, Las leyes funda-
mentales.... This author believed that defending absolut-
ism did not necessarily have to mean defending a despot-
ic, tyrannical king. Like a good man of the Church, he 
believed that the absolute king could not reign absolutely. 
The author adduced the restoration of the fundamental 
laws and ancient freedoms, disapproved of the policies of 
the first Bourbon and claimed that if Philip V had main-
tained the furs/fueros, the influence of the old hierarchies 
– nobility, Church and landowners – would have quelled 
the philosophical doctrines.
Just after the Carlist defeat and the enactment of the 
1841 Compromise Law in Navarra, Magí Ferrer proposed 
establishing provincial courts with their own laws and 
taxation. It is telling that he framed the debate in provin-
cialist terms. Under the pretext that in Spain everyone 
had to be Spaniards – Magí Ferrer wrote – he proclaimed 
that “antes que provincianos, somos españoles” (before 
provincials, we’re Spaniards). The liberals were predict-
ing that provincialism would endanger or break “el vin-
culo de la unidad monàrquica, o según el estilo republica-
no, de la unidad constitucional” [the bond of monarchical 
unity, or in the republican style, of constitutional unity].25 
In any case, Carlist provincialism was not an improvisa-
tion, and the issue of the furs was not a minor one, despite 
the Carlist leaders’ allergy to it. Nor was liberal Basque 
provincialism in the defence of its own fueros.
Once the liberal queen Isabella II was dethroned in 
September 1868, a new phase was ushered in. Decades of 
state expansion were a thing of the past, and a new era 
started in which the demands of decentralisation or 
shared sovereignty cut across Catalan politics. The Carlist 
formula was twofold: a Spain comprised of foral provinc-
es following the model of Basque-Navarra, and the return 
of the furs to the territories in the former Crown of 
Aragon. The “Letter-Manifesto” that Charles wrote to his 
brother, Alphonse of Bourbon, dated 30 June 1869 in Par-
is and penned by the writer Antoni Aparisi i Guijarro, is 
the most influential programmatic text in fin-de-siècle 
Carlism. The document states that the Spanish people 
had always loved decentralisation, and that the king’s will 
was not to downgrade the Basque fueros but for the re-
maining provinces to match them in terms of their inter-
nal laws, albeit adapting them. This was the clearest ex-
pression of the shift in direction of the Carlist authority 
until the start of the war. The manifesto was not explicit 
recognition of Catalan furs but maintained the discourse 
of the monarchy of provinces.
We would be wrong if we thought that Catalan Carlist 
foralism always trailed on the shirttails of the pretender’s 
initiative. Foralism cannot be reduced to royal documents 
and the defence of the Basque and Navarran fueros. Those 
years witnessed an upsurge in the Catalan issue of forality 
via electoral manifestos, parliamentary speeches, lectures 
in circles, books in a historical tone and popular leaflets. 
One of the prime explicitly foral expressions came from 
the young ultra-Catholic lawyer and journalist Lluís Ma-
ria de Llauder in his address to the electors in the district 
of Vic in January 1869, therefore prior to the Charles’ let-
ter. The goal was to restore the furs while making them 
compatible with modern life. By doing so, centralisation 
could be halted, the administration would be moralised 
and the fifths (the conscription of every fifth young man 
by lottery) would be eliminated. In other articles, he 
stressed that the furs would not only rectify the centralis-
ing process but were also a Catholic alternative to republi-
can federalism. This is an important issue if we want to 
understand the main players’ political grammar beyond 
the judgements that historians may make. The rivalry be-
tween the foralists and the federals during the Sexennium 
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would be reproduced with the Catalanists during the Res-
toration.
During those years, a juridical and historical literature 
appeared which evoked the religiosity of the Catalans and 
the goodness of their parliamentary institutions. They in-
clude works like the ones by the Girona lawyer Narcís 
Blanch, the canon of Barcelona Mateu Bruguera and the 
anonymous leaflet penned in Catalan entitled Los cata-
lans y sos furs. Llibre editat per un fill de la terra, which 
was written in a colloquial language to attract a grassroots 
audience. Allusions to the furs appeared in parliamentary 
speeches such as the one by the Carlist lawyer and deputy 
for Girona, Emili Sicars, who on 27 May 1871 condemned 
the Bourbon dynasty personified by Philip V for the loss 
of the furs and the problems brought about by the fact 
that the magistrates, prosecutors and trial judges were 
unfamiliar with the language and particular laws of Cata-
lonia. This also arose in the speeches by Joan Mestre i 
Tudela, the former mayor of Lleida and future vice-presi-
dent of the Carlist deputation, at the opening of the Cath-
olic-monarchic circle in his city on 3 January 1869, one of 
the first in Catalonia to join the cause. In his address, he 
said that conscription and the tax system, the fifths and 
the taxes on general food consumption, were the outcome 
of the liberal policies that the furs sought to remove.
Between 8 April and 16 July 1872, the date when the 
first factions appeared and the return of the furs was an-
nounced by Charles, news reports gleaned from the calls 
of the Carlist groups at the entrances and exits of the vil-
lages started to appear in the press. With no attempt to list 
them exhaustively, the slogans included “Long live the 
Catalan furs!”, “To Don Carlos and Religion!”, and calls 
to expel the foreign king, Amadeus of Savoy, mixed in 
with calls of “Long live Spain!”. We have evidence that on 
1 May, the faction of Guerxo de la Ratera faction did this 
in Agramunt; on 30 May the faction of Francesc Savalls 
did so in Sarrià de Ter; one day later, the faction of Quico 
de Constantí followed suit in El Vendrell; on 1 July the 
faction of Camats in Vilanova de Meià; and on 22 June 
the former deputy for Torroella de Montgrí, Joan Vidal 
de Llobatera, did so in Santa Pau, even though one year 
earlier he had given a speech to the electors in his district 
that was respectful of the furs. From north to south and 
westward, foralism was displayed in rituals of political af-
firmation and spread far and wide before the proclama-
tion was published in the Barcelona and Madrid press in 
late July and early August 1872.
The document stating the return of the furs in July had 
two parts. The first was a statement of intentions which 
referred to the “Letter-Manifesto” and was addressed to 
Catalans, Aragonese and Valencians, in this order, in-
forming them that Charles was giving back to them what 
his ancestor, Philip V, had erased as a reward for their 
loyalty. In the summer of 1872, there had been a failed at-
tempted uprising in the northern region of the Basque 
Country-Navarra, while the only territory where the in-
surrection persisted was Catalonia. This is one of the 
countless pieces of evidence that revealed that Catalan 
Carlism was not peripheral in the overall history of Carl-
ism. The second part of the document is an important se-
lection of the main Catalan furs revolving around the 
commitment to Catholic unity, the fiscal sovereignty of 
the Diputació General and the Catalan Courts, the elimi-
nation of the fifths, attention to the municipal regime and 
the country’s juridical physiognomy. The goal was no 
longer merely to maintain Catalan law or find a provin-
cial accommodation but to restore and adapt the former 
Catalan furs within the framework of a composite Catho-
lic monarchy. Immediately thereafter, from Tarragona, 
the Madrid-based Carlist newspaper La Esperanza wrote 
on 29 October that the youths were presenting themselves 
“en demanda de fusiles para combatir en favor de los fuer-
os de Cataluña” [demanding rifles to fight in favour of the 
furs of Catalonia], and that unlike the liberal Catholics, 
the fatherland’s traditions cannot be invoked unless the 
furs were defended.
Not all Spanish Carlist leaders agreed with the step that 
the pretender took. The Carlist chief of staff Hermenegil-
do Díaz de Cevallos, a prominent agent in Northern Cata-
lonia, thought that it was a dire mistake that could erase 
what the dynasty had achieved on behalf of Spain’s ad-
ministrative unity. The liberal press in Madrid, such as La 
Época, warned that foralism was drawing dangerously 
close to republican federalism, destroying the efforts of 
the Catholic Monarchs and setting national unity ablaze. 
Even the Madrid correspondent of the Diario de Barcelo-
na distinguished positive administrative decentralisation 
from what was tantamount to a rupture in national unity, 
which would mean as many governments as there were 
provinces in the state.
The reception by the federal republican press differed 
in Barcelona and Madrid. In the summer months of 1872 
and the second half of 1874, the liberal and republican 
press in Barcelona debated the validity and sense of this 
foralism with journalists and historians. The relationship 
with republicanism did not end there. A letter from Vic to 
La Esperanza dated 20 August 1872 celebrated the fact 
that all of Catalonia had turned republican since Charles 
had restored the furs. The furs “no son cosa más que una 
República muy bien ordenada a la libertad verdadera y al 
alivio positivo del pobre y menesteroso (...)” [are nothing 
other than a Republic strongly ordered towards true free-
dom and the positive alleviation of poverty and want 
(…)]. The Republic of the furs was the Republic of God, a 
model where Catholicism strengthened the traditionalist 
– not despotic – interpretation of Carlism.
The establishment of a deputation in Sant Joan de les 
Abadesses in the winter of 1874 was the outcome of a se-
ries of conditions. Catalan Carlism was experiencing a 
growth crisis, with military victories yet serious govern-
ance problems. Comings and goings of commissions of 
politicians and large landowners in the royal barracks had 
been common since late 1873. Despite the king’s decision 
to create a Deputation of Catalonia in May 1874, the op-
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eration was merely administrative and therefore insuffi-
cient. Once again, Catalan pressures were viewed nega-
tively. Two days after prince Alphonse of Bourbon 
received a committee of Carlists demanding a political 
solution for the Principality in an audience in Solsona, he 
wrote to his brother in severe terms. He notified him that 
a group of landowners wanted a governing board to ap-
point local authorities and collect taxes, “y todo no es más 
que para trabajar a la Independència de Cataluña. Lo que 
los catalanes desean, bajo la palabra Fueros, es declararse 
independientes de España. Esto me consta por varios con-
ductos, y esto es lo que siempre yo preveia y de lo cual no 
dudé nunca” [and all of this is nothing other than working 
for the Independence of Catalonia. What the Catalans 
want, under the word Fueros, is to declare themselves in-
dependent from Spain. This has been shown to me in dif-
ferent conducts, and this is what I always predicted and 
what I never doubted]. Alphonse’s imperial, uniformist 
vision had its adherents. One Carlist border agent, Josep 
Maria Galí, wrote to Charles’ military secretary, Guiller-
mo Estrada, telling him that the Carlists were demanding 
too much, “casi la omnipotència y la inmortalidad” [al-
most omnipotence and immortality], and that “las ten-
dencias antiautoritarias” [the antiauthoritarian tenden-
cies] of the furs had to be contained.26
The pressures from the landowner boards meeting in 
Olot and Vic forced the pretender to issue a decree in Es-
tella dated 26 July 1874 establishing a War Deputation. 
On 1 October, the decision was made public by the veter-
an general Rafael Tristany; one month later he moved to 
Sant Joan de les Abadesses, and his action there lasted un-
til the siege of La Seu d’Urgell in August 1875. In the early 
days of October, official acts were held in Olot, La Seu 
d’Urgell and Vic which the Deputation interpreted as 
working towards the return of the furs. This was the gist 
of several articles in the Carlist press which called for 
martyrdom for the King, Religion and Catalan freedoms. 
The public display of the portrait of Charles in Olot, deco-
rated with inscriptions like “Fora quintes, Visca la Unitat 
Catòlica i Visca el Rei don Carles VII ‘restaurador de los 
fueros de Cataluña’ [Away with the fifths, long live Catho-
lic Unity and long live the King, Charles II, restorer of the 
furs of Catalonia] was laden with strong symbolic value. 
The Deputation was led by 16 councillors, prominent 
men from the earlier political and electoral Carlism. Their 
authorities included administration and political repre-
sentation, control of taxation and justice (a Regional 
Court), public order with the return of the local police 
force (the mossos d’esquadra) and the management of 
hospitals and communications. Despite the mockery 
from the Madrid press, the experience was quite real. In 
February 1875, the liberal military officer Arsenio Mar-
tínez Campos, then the captain-general of Catalonia, re-
ported to his contacts on the frontier between the Carlists 
and the federal republicans about an alliance consisting in 
granting the furs and “una autonomia administrativa, con 
aumento de jornales y disminución de horas de trabajo, 
con objeto de ganarse la causa obrera” [an administrative 
autonomy, with an increase in day wages and a decrease 
in working hours with the goal of winning over the work-
ing-class cause].27
Catalan political Carlism until the 
advent of mass society, 1868-1936
Historians have made the mistake of seeing Carlism late 
in the century as a secondary actor in politics. Our knowl-
edge of monarchism still falls short, even though as a 
country, Catalonia was as republican as it was monarchic. 
Figure 4. La Flaca, 14 August 
1869. The satirical Barcelona 
magazine La Flaca wanted to 
denounce that the Catholic 
Church continued to be subsidized 
by the state in 1869 and at the 
same time was supporting the 
Carlists, enemies of liberalism. 
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Nor have we sufficiently valued the rich, extensive Catho-
lic socialisation. The conflict between the free thinkers 
and Catholics was a long-term cleavage throughout Eu-
rope. Between 1869 and 1872, or between 1876 and 1888, 
the Carlists were prime actors in Catholic socialisation. 
Catholic action was their sphere of action, even as it de-
tracted from Carlism’s projection in the new spaces with-
in mass society. With the consolidation of the Restoration 
in 1876, Carlism had to wait patiently. The military defeat 
was also a political defeat inasmuch as the public image of 
the king was marred by the discrepancies with the Church 
and desacralised by the family and sex scandals.28 The 
years full of apocalyptic pronouncements were a thing of 
the past. According to the eschatological view of time, 
Carlism had to wait for the arrival of new symptoms of 
the exhaustion of the liberal system. This is what Lluís 
Maria de Llauder thought when he was the head of the 
Catalan Regional Carlist Board upon witnessing the colo-
nial overthrow in Cuba and the Philippines in 1898.
The Carlist party would continue capturing action and 
propaganda platforms until the Integralist schism of 
1888. Then, but not before, was when it lost part of the 
personnel who backed Charles in 1868. And in 1890, 
when the Marquise of Cerralbo was appointed delegate 
king of Spain, the party was rebuilt according to a model 
cast in the mould of the Associació Catòlico-Monàrquica 
of 1870, with boards, press and socialisation centres. It is 
mistaken to present fin-de-siècle Carlism as a “new” Carl-
ism because the underpinnings of the party’s modernisa-
tion, socialisation and political culture dated back to the 
Democratic Sexennium. It is equally mistaken to think 
that the new personnel in 1868 used it as a counter-revo-
lutionary umbrella and discarded it when they were de-
feated.29
The crisis at the end of Isabella’s reign revived a cause 
that had seemed dead. Carlism was a political label with-
out an organisation, a “religious-monarchical commun-
ion”, as Josep Maria Carulla30 has defined it, with a little-
known pretender. A modern political alternative of 
extraordinary consequence in Catalan society was con-
structed in short order. It occupied the electoral space on 
the right and virtually monopolised the Catholic cause 
against the backdrop of the anticlerical offensive. Despite 
the caricature of the pre-political illiterate peasant, the 
Carlist leadership ranks were filled by young, urban law-
yers in frock coats. Even the first faction to head out on 
campaign on the night of 7 to 8 April 1872 did so from the 
plain of Barcelona.
Former anti-Catholic mayors from Lleida, Vic, Girona, 
Tortosa, Olot and Balaguer joined the “new” Carlist 
cause. After 1868, and more specifically after 1870, it vir-
tually moulted its political structures. It equipped itself 
with numerous social centres and committees of promi-
nent men with the mission of attacking the institutions by 
means of electoral combat, propaganda and, if needed, a 
coup d’état. It was a modern party model in the European 
context comparable in density to the republican party and 
more advanced than the remnants of the moderates and 
the governing progressive liberal party. The design fea-
tured the veteran cabdill Ramon Cabrera shortly before 
he resigned, taking England’s Tory party as its model.31
Catalan Carlism did not reflect the ideal party type. 
The leadership structure was more reminiscent of a con-
federation of prominent men, and even though it was not 
entirely so, nor was it a party of the masses. Perhaps it was 
the first attempt at a cadre party in Catalonia, which 
evolved during the Restoration towards a more complex 
organisation with a rich social and territorial base aimed 
 
Figure 5. La Flaca, 
4 September 1870. The 
caricature features a chaplain 
with the blunderbuss 
harangue the Carlists 
characterised as a flock of 
sheep. The motto “Dios, Patria 
y Rey” characteristic of this 
movement can be seen.
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at cultivating a community alterity to liberal society. 
There was no correlation between its rootedness and its 
scant representation in the parliamentary institutions, 
among other reasons because they could not control all 
the tricks of electoral corruption.
This Traditionalist Communion was organised in a py-
ramidal structure, with a Central Board for all of Spain 
along with provincial, district and local boards. Between 
1870 and 1872, at least 166 boards were established 
throughout Catalonia, 89 of which were in the province of 
Girona, while 902 were created in Spain. Its deep penetra-
tion in Girona contradicts the assertion that the boards 
were not very representative. When Carlism reorganised 
under the leadership of the Marquise of Cerralbo and 
Lluís Maria de Llauder in 1892, there were around 1,000 
boards, 197 in Catalonia alone. These figures would in-
crease until they were disbanded by government repres-
sion from 1899 to 1900. Since their creation, they played a 
key role in establishing the party locally, in calling for 
elections and in legally defending the candidates. Unlike 
the Restoration, some supporters also worked in the un-
derground armament boards preparing for the coup. In 
retrospect, the model was similar in both periods, al-
though in the Restoration there were regional boards 
which coordinated all the others.
The concept of political culture may be useful in further 
exploring the grammar of Carlism, what it thought and es-
pecially how its members experienced identification with 
a political agenda. We view political culture as the sphere 
that analyses the attitudes, beliefs and values shared by the 
individuals comprising a group. Historiography has not 
sufficiently stressed the cultural and discursive values that 
the Carlists conferred on politics. For some years, we have 
known that they constructed a rich repertoire of symbols 
and vocabulary, with a report, a commemorative calendar 
and an alternative pantheon to the romantic liberal hero 
archetypes. Between 1869 and 1872, the political and sym-
bolic patterns of the king and his family were updated, and 
modern propaganda instruments were adopted. The male 
symbol of the beret was joined by the female symbol of the 
daisy, the female section of Carlist traditionalism. At that 
time, galleries of illustrious veterans were published in an 
amalgam of Catholic and Carlist martyrdom. This opera-
tion would extend throughout the Restoration and culmi-
nate in 1896 with the celebration of the tradition’s annual 
festival of martyrs every 10 March.
In 1868, a portrait of the pretender was constructed fol-
lowing the virile archetype of the Catholic gentleman and 
good breadwinner who was paternalistic toward his sub-
jects. This signalled the start of pilgrimages to spaces of 
memory in exile, such as the one recounted by the writer 
Josep Maria Carulla. The journeys to palaces and “sanctu-
aries” like the one in the chapel of Saint Charles in Saint 
Justus cathedral in Trieste anticipated the pilgrimages to 
Palazzo Loredan in Venice late in the century. They were 
years when the political language was updated, when the 
pejorative “sipai” (sepoy) was used for local liberal volun-
teers, comparing them to the indigenous servants of the 
English in India. The Carlist political culture contained 
an entire conception of the world, a Weltanschauung, 
which materialised in the popular consumption of match-
boxes, playing cards, wine and liqueur labels, decorated 
fans and calling cards bearing the portraits of kings, 
alongside prints with the images of the Sacred Heart of 
Jesus and the Immaculate Conception.
The commemorative festivals in the post-war Catalo-
nia of 1876 were a test of this political culture because 
they were not the same everywhere. Liberal and republi-
can festivals commemorating the dead or the defences of 
towns like Igualada, Collformic, Caldes de Montbuí and 
Puigcerdà were common in Catalonia, while the recollec-
tion of the revolution of the cantons predominated in An-
dalusia, Cartagena and the Region of Valencia. This 
would change in the early 20th century, and the emotion-
al experience and Carlism revived sites of worship for po-
litical use, like Butsènit and Montserrat in 1907, and or-
ganised gatherings in memory of the victims of 
Montalegre in 1910 and Vinyoles d’Orís in 1912. Some 
reflected a local calendar, like the longstanding Tres Ro-
ures gathering in Bages. Others displayed a considerable 
capacity to attract participants by combining the local 
and national calendars, as in the appropriation of the cen-
tennial celebrations of the Peninsular War with those of 
the 1808 Battles of Bruc in Manresa and Igualada in 1908. 
Further proof of its power was the “Pilgrimage of Loyalty” 
in 1913, which transferred the remains of Rafael Tristany 
from Lorda to Ardèvol.
One important instrument of political modernisation 
was social centres, especially the Carlist circle or casino. 
There were 28 of them in Catalonia during the Democrat-
ic Sexennium, even though it was common for the Carlist 
men and families in small cities to attend the Catholic cir-
cle when there was no Carlist one, with 26 in the entire 
country. This practice also aligned them as local political 
rivals. In 1892, there were 42 circles, but this figure had 
risen to 100 four years later, one-third of the total in 
Spain. The centres facilitated community outreach and 
served as a kind of inter-class mirror and grassroots base, 
as demonstrated by Jordi Canal in his study of the papers 
from the Carlist circle in Olot between 1889 and 1990, 
whose prominent members included artisans and work-
ers, field hands, small merchants and landowners.32 Plays 
and choirs were held in the circles; there was room for po-
litical speeches and leisure areas where members could 
have a coffee or liqueur, along with reading and billiard 
rooms. Later on, these activities were joined by banquets 
and literary soirées, night classes and charitable works.
Catalonia had the most boards and circles and was on 
the cutting edge in modernising Carlism, perhaps because 
it was the most advanced society and the one with the 
densest web of associations in all of Spain. The Region of 
Valencia had the second largest number of boards and 
circles during both the Democratic Sexennium and the 
Restoration, more than the Basque Country and Navarra, 
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where informal socialising was more common. Likewise, 
the existence of boards in Barcelona neighbourhoods was 
nothing new, as the towns of Gràcia, Sants and Hosta-
francs had had them during the Sexennium before they 
were annexed to the city. However, this relative continui-
ty should not conceal the advent of new forms of organi-
sation and propaganda common to the advent of mass 
society, such as the Carlist youth groups in Barcelona in 
1896 and Manresa in 1903, and women’s groups, the 
“Daisies”, in 1919.
In terms of propaganda, 35 newspapers were published 
in Catalonia during the Sexennium, while 99 appeared 
between 1876 and 1915, some of them temporary to avoid 
being suspended. The data reveal a lively civil society and 
a no less dense political life, which became fertile ground 
for political subcultures in Manresa, Olot, Vic, Igualada, 
Berga, Figueres, Tortosa and Mataró. Another indicator 
was Carlism’s heavy electoral presence, specifically in the 
legislature of 1871 and 1872, where it achieved 13 seats, 
just behind the 15 for the republicans and 14 for the gov-
erning party. The total number of seats, along with the 
Carlists chosen in the Catholic candidacies from 1869 and 
1870, was 17, an estimable number if we bear in mind that 
between 1890 and 1923, with universal suffrage, they 
earned 20 seats.
Lluís Maria de Llauder,33 who had been the editor of 
the Barcelona newspaper La Convicción (1870-1873) and 
the founder and director of El Correo Catalán between 
1878 and 1899, helped update the repertoire of mobilisa-
tion and national and international pilgrimages in the 
early years of the Restoration alongside Manuel de Llan-
za, Duke of Solferino. They once again led the Joventut 
Catòlica and the Associació de Catòlics. However, it was 
clear that the control over Catholic socialisation was not 
sufficient in the dispute over hegemonies. Attention to 
campaigns to get signatures for Catholic unity was dis-
placed by campaigns to oppose the civil code and atten-
tion to Catalan interests. In the 1880s and 1890s, there 
emerged a web of Catalanist entities and politicised eco-
nomic sectors where Carlism felt like a poor fit. Carlist 
jurists like Emili Sicars participated in the campaigns 
against the civil code, but the political initiative had been 
lost. Even though it has been demonstrated that the inter-
est in the furs was not a historical peculiarity but an in-
strument to analyse the present, the most rigorous study 
of the time was written by two authors from outside Carl-
ism, Josep Coroleu and Josep Pella i Forgas.
The Carlists were afraid of being engulfed by the in-
creasing presence of Catalanism. They went from their 
initial disdain to apprehension over the new competitor. 
Figure 6. La Flaca, 30 January 1873. Caricature against the Carlists.
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At the end of the century, there were different signs of 
concern, as revealed in the document written by the Carl-
ist minority in the Courts in 1897, known as the Acta de 
Loredan. Separatism should be considered an abomina-
tion; however, this was a double-edged sword. For the 
Carlists, stressing their distance from separatism was use-
ful both at home, at a time of strong Spanish nationalisa-
tion, and abroad, to distance themselves from Catalanism 
and other extreme provincialisms. In any event, in the 
opinion of Llauder and many Catalan Carlists, one could 
not be a good Carlist without being a good Spaniard. Cen-
tralism was the outcome of parliamentary liberalism, not 
of Philip V or the Bourbon dynasty. This position was a 
far cry from the stance of the Catalanists, who sought to 
carve out their own space and not be confused with Cath-
olic intransigence. How was it possible that the liberals, 
who had destroyed the Basque fueros, now wanted to be 
regionalists?
Historiography has compared the arcs of three figures 
in fin-de-siècle Carlism and their relationship with Cata-
lanism: the aforementioned Lluís Maria de Llauder, the 
writer and painter Marià Vayreda and the pedagogue 
Joan Bardina.34 It is clear that mechanical connections be-
tween foralism and Catalanism should not be sought. 
However, as the conflict caused by the Spanish nationali-
sation processes on the one hand and the regionalist mo-
bilisation on the other progressed, Catalanism affected all 
political cultures. It is reasonable to think that Carlist and 
integralist foralism was one of the many substrates of the 
Catholic right who were part of the Catalanist family. 
Alongside them were a Carlist Hispanicism reluctant to 
talk about the furs and combative with Catalanism. The 
trajectories were intricate because rivalry permeated all 
nationalisation processes and all nationalisms, including 
Spanish nationalism. The key questions are why it was so 
difficult to maintain dual patriotism, and why the inter-
pretations of it in Madrid and Barcelona were divergent. 
Might it be that part of historiography views the constitu-
tion of Spain as a nation-state, without fissures, as natural 
and teleological?
We have a long road ahead before we fully understand 
the local political traditions and more than just a handful 
personal histories, however valuable they may be. There 
are cases like the clergyman and journalist Gaietà Soler, 
who criticised Enric Prat de la Riba and his “practical Cat-
alan liberalism” because this patriotism eroded religious 
foundations. Yet this story is contradicted by the figure 
who became the mayor of Manresa in a Catholic-region-
alist candidacy in 1904, the former Integralist Pere Ar-
mengou i Manso, because as the historian Gemma Rubí 
has said, local politics was crucial. In terms of Carlism, it 
was the satellite of Catalanism precisely in a city like Man-
resa, which was the second most important stronghold of 
the Lliga Regionalista in Catalonia. In the city of Vic, the 
historian Xavier Tornafoch discovered that prominent 
Integralists like Manuel Moret and Joan Vilanova left the 
party to become Catalanists. In fact, Integralism is be-
lieved to have evolved towards regionalism and became 
an appendix to the Catalanist right thanks to its foralism. 
In contrast, the Carlists and Catalanists vied for a com-
mon space.35
Joan Bardina confirmed the overly schematic cliché of 
the Lliga Regionalista’s shift from Carlism to Catalanism. 
Perhaps Catalunya autònoma (1899) and Catalunya i els 
carlins (1900) are the most notable cases in terms of the 
value of his writings. The author stressed opposition to 
separatism and Spanish confederalism, as well as the fact 
that Catalonia was the fatherland and the nation, and that 
it was as much a nation as Portugal was. The list of cases 
could go on. The economist from Lleida, Joan Bergós, was 
the driving force behind the Bases de Manresa, the found-
er of the Associació Cultural Catalanista and the cultiva-
tor of the Jocs Florals. Manuel Roger de Llúria, the top 
Carlist leader in in Lleida, left the Traditionalist Com-
munion and became associated with Catalanist circles. 
Perhaps the path laid down in Mollerussa was representa-
tive of this model, although it gradually made its way into 
Catalanist dynamics, such as the Catalan language festival 
in 1916, the Acadèmia Montserratina and the Pomells de 
Joventut in 1920.
In any event, historians should not confuse these pro-
cesses among the grassroots and some young leaders with 
the official position of the pretenders and the personnel 
closest to them. Mistrust of the scope of provincialism, 
foralism and traditionalist regionalism would remain a 
fixture in the hierarchy. This kind of issue was further ex-
acerbated within the explosive context of mass society. 
The Duke of Solferino was 52 years old when he agreed to 
be the regional head of the Communion,36 as he would 
again be in 1910 and 1915, and 1917 and 1919, represent-
ing the official line that was close to the Lliga both elector-
ally and socially. The tactical shift to situate himself in the 
Lliga Regionalista camp was a matter of political survival. 
Internal cleavages were affected not only by the rap-
prochement with regionalism but also by two further fac-
tors. One was the extraordinary upswing in social con-
flicts, such as the 1902 general strike and Tragic Week in 
1909. The other depended on local variables and the poli-
cies of alliances, which forced one to choose Catalanists 
or dynastics, or even republicans, as travelling compan-
ions in elections. These manoeuvres were uncomfortable 
for the regional board and ended with the expulsion of 
the Lleida leaders in 1913 and the dissolution of the 
Boards in the district of Berga and Manresa in 1917.
After strict centralist and militaristic repression, Carl-
ist participation in the Solidaritat Catalana coalition 
(1907-1909) alongside Catalanists and republicans was 
the catalyst to securing six deputies. It also sealed one of 
its closest encounters with Catalanism. One of the mas-
terminds was Miquel Junyent, who led the party in the 
province of Barcelona, served as the director of El Correo 
Catalán between 1903 and 1933 and would become the 
regional chief between 1915 and 1917 and 1919 and 1923. 
Tellingly, in 1916 the Marquise of Cerralbo warned about 
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becoming too dependent on the Lliga Regionalista be-
cause it was liberal, and due to “su dudoso españolismo” 
[its dubious Hispanicism]. As the victory of Solidaritat 
Catalana was still gelling, the Duke of Solferino, a senator, 
received an angry response from General José López 
Domínguez in the session on 21 February 1908. Regard-
ing the idea that Catalonia was an autonomous state and 
Spain a confederation of states, the latter stated “Para no-
sotros, para los verdaderos patriotas, para los hombres 
constitucionales y parlamentarios, eso equivale a ser an-
tiespañol” [To us, to the real patriots, to constitutional 
and parliamentary men, this is equivalent to being anti-
Spanish].37
In 1930, the Lliga Regionalista regained control of the 
provincial council of Barcelona and was preparing to re-
store the Mancomunitat. Feeling banished, Carlism draft-
ed a statute of autonomy, which signalled a major tactical 
and legal shift. The text upheld Catalonia’s full autonomy 
via a free federation, the official status of the Catalan lan-
guage, economic concert and “organic universal suf-
frage”. Later, when the republican Generalitat was pro-
claimed and the statute of autonomy was being debated, it 
voted affirmatively despite its reservations about the 
wording and its disagreement with the religious issue. For 
the regionalist sector, represented by Tomàs Caylà, the 
1932 statute did not conform to the idea of an Iberian 
confederation and was further insufficient because it did 
not stipulate that Catalonia would have its own army. 
Caylà was the last regional chief before the outbreak of the 
Civil War. He had previously directed Joventut, a weekly 
from Valls, where he had published Charles VII’s promise 
to restore the furs. Caylà felt sincere Hispanicism and re-
jected separatism, yet a significant sector of Carlism nega-
tively interpreted the historical rapprochement with the 
Lliga and aspired to uphold a uniform Spain.
Dalmacio Iglésies was one of the leaders who stood 
against regionalism because he believed that the priority 
was to become an alternative to the order of the Catalan 
right. All the Carlists wanted this, but Iglésies’ plans ad-
dressed the social issue from a Hispanicist perspective. 
Alejandro Lerroux’s republicans had to be dealt with vig-
orously with a social policy that was more autonomous 
from the Church. The mass policy was impacting the 
streets of Barcelona, and one sector of Carlism saw the 
opportunity to use the Carlist youth culture of violence 
against the Lerrouxist anticlerical impetuosity, while the 
official sector believed that the solution entailed instating 
Catholic and regionalist social paternalism. The clash be-
tween Carlists and republicans in Sant Feliu de Llobregat 
on 28 May 1912 resulted in five deaths, joined by the two 
deaths in Granollers on 13 August. To these young gen-
erations, the old formulas were useless, as proven by the 
failure of the 1900 uprising in Badalona, which shuttered 
the Carlist insurrectional circle.
In 1907, Joan Maria Roma assembled defence groups 
called “requetès”. Three years later, under the direction of 
the Valencian politician and military officer Joaquim Llo-
rens, they were transformed into a paramilitary group, 
shock force and youth school. It was the first one in Spain 
in the 20th century, comparable to the Camelots du Roi of 
Action Française. The Duke of Solferino was also opposed 
by weeklies like La Trinchera (1912-1919), which picked 
quarrels with El Correo Catalán and gave its readers 
Browning pistols and Mauser rifles. This strain of Carlism 
grew on the plain of Barcelona around the resurgence of 
numerous circles made up of workers and clerks from the 
middle and lower classes who had arrived in the wave of 
migration.
The anti-Lliga Carlist sector strengthened its bonds 
with far-right groups in the climate after the Great War. 
In late 1918 and early 1919, tensions on the streets be-
tween radical Catalanists and extreme Hispanicists 
surged in the midst the issue of approval of the draft stat-
ute of autonomy. Faced with the “órdago separatista” 
[separatist threat], the Liga Patriótica Española was 
formed with Carlists, civilian police, soldiers, civil serv-
ants, RCD Español football club fans and former Ler-
rouxists, elbow-to-elbow with Alfons Sala’s Unión 
Monárquica Nacional. It was an amalgam that later 
served as a quarry for fascism. The outbreak of the La 
Canadenca strike in 1919 was a milestone in class solidar-
ity, but it eclipsed the other conflicts. The Sindicats Lliu-
res emerged within this context.
Formally, the Sindicats Lliures or Corporació General 
de Treballadors were founded in a meeting at Barcelona’s 
Ateneu Obrer Legitimista in October 1919, and their first 
headquarters was the Círcol Central Tradicionalista in 
Barcelona. Prominent Carlists, councillors and journal-
ists like Miquel Junyent participated in the gathering, but 
the leader of the project was the Carlist Ramón Sales, a 
former member of the mercantile union of the CNT. The 
Sindicats Lliures filled the void left by the failure of Cath-
olic syndicalism by marginalising any reference to Carl-
ism. These associations had exclusively professional and 
economic objectives.38 Their origin stemmed from the 
difficulties that the Captaincy General and civil govern-
ment, the utmost representatives of the state, were having 
controlling the streets. Perhaps it would be reductionistic 
to consider them a company union and the action-orient-
ed arm of the manufacturers, but the authorities were not 
quite sure how to control society. Hence, the prominent 
role of figures like Bartolomé Roselló, commander of the 
military garrison, and the union’s ties with the employers’ 
association or the civil government, depending on the pe-
riod. It was a cross-cutting wave of violence where gun-
men from the police and employers’ associations clashed 
with members of the sometent militia and the Sindicats 
Lliures, all against the CNT. Too many lives were snuffed 
out, including that of the syndicalist Salvador Seguí and 
the lawyer Francesc Layret.39
Ultimately it was a kind of violence that was common 
all over Europe in response to the crisis of parliamentary 
liberalism and the revolutionary peril. The era of the cab-
dills was over, and the age of the banalisation of violence 
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was being ushered in. According to figures from the un-
ion itself, as reported by Colin M. Winston, the Sindicats 
Lliures reached 120,000 affiliates in Catalonia in 1929, 
within a favourable context and heavy anti-confederal re-
pression. In 1936, supporting the antirepublican coup 
d’état, the Carlists had a theoretical contingent of 18,160 
requetès in Catalonia, which would later feed the military 
shock unit of the Terç de Requetès de la Mare de Déu de 
Montserrat.40
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